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W hat is needed is a permanent and effective system whereby the 
law may be kept under constant review; a body to study aspects of the 
law anti make recommendations when changes arc considered necessary; 
and most important of all, a system which will ensure prompt and ef­
fective machinery for translating such recommendations into law.
New Brunswick has in the past shown a commendable willingness to 
implement reforms in the law when such are brought to attention. An 
example is the manner in which the legislature became the first in 
Canada to adopt the new W ills Act proposed by the Conference of Com­
missioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada. It is to be hoped 
that this progressive spirit will continue and that the legislature in future 
will take advantage of the work of such bodies as the Law Reform Com­
mittee. In particular, it should repeal s. 1 (a), (b), (c), (e) and s. 2 of the 
Statute of F rauds and s. 5 of the Sale of Goods Act.
—1 ’. B. Drummie,
Lord Bcaverbrook Overseas Scholar, 
London School of Economcs.
IVEAGH V. INLAND REVENUE COM M ISSIONERS *
Conflict of Laws — Voluntary Settlement of Intagible Movables — 
Proper Law of the Settlement — Imputed Intention of 
the Parties — Relevant Considerations
By a voluntary settlement dated July 1, 1907, when the territory of 
the Republic of Ireland formed part of the United Kingdom, certain 
shares, Dearer bonds and other securities were settled on E.G. for life 
with a power of appointment in favour of his wife and children. The 
settlement contained a very w'ide investment clause, including express­
ly investment in land in England, but there was no express power to 
invest in freehold land in Ireland. The settlement was drafted and 
prepared by solicitors in England and at all material times the shares 
ana other indicia of title were kept in a bank in England, although 
there was power under the settlement to keep the securities in Ireland. 
At the date of the settlement the domicile of all the parties to it was 
Ireland. It w'as executed in England. The tenant for life had married in 
1903, and by appointments made in 1946 and 1948 he surrendered his 
life interest in part of the settled property in favour of his daughters. 
On a question as to whether estate duty was exigible on £75,000 ordin­
ary shares in an English company, Arthur Guinness, Son & Co. Ltd., 
registered on the register kept in Dublin by the company and locally 
situate there,1 on the death of the tenant for life in 1949, it was held,
• 11954] Ch. 364.
1. Shares in a company are situate at the place where they can be transferred, which  
is norm ally the registered office. See D tcey's C onflict of L aw s, 6th Ed., 1949, p. 306. 
Land, Trusts In the C onflict of U w > , 1940, holds the view that "for purposes of deter­
mining the law governing trusts of intangible personal property the element of 
location of the trust property should be used in the sense of the place where the  
securities are physically kept.” (p. 211. He states that this is the view the A m eri­
can courts have taken, (p. 88>. Cf. T reasu re r of O ntario v. Blonde et a l. [1946 ] 4
D.L.R. 785; [1947] A.C. 24 (J.C.P.C.i Falconbridge, Conflict of L aw , 2nd. Ed., 1954, 
at p. 500 says in reference to the situs of shares: “ . . . it is not certain to what 
extent the tests adopted for the purposes of taxation are identical with the tests 
that should be adopted for the purpose of the conflict of laws . . .”
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by Upjohn J., that for the* purposes of estate duty the settlement was
foverned bv its proper law wliich was the law of the Republic of reland.2
In determining the proper law, the learned judge considered the 
domicile of the settlor, the beneficiaries and the trustees, the form and 
contents of the settlement, the place where the settlement was drafted 
and executed, in what country the trust was managed, the nature and 
situs of the trust property and the physical location of the share certifi­
cates and other indicia of title, and the scope of the investment clause.3
One of the significant features of this judgment is the holding bv 
the court that the law which governs the “rights and liabilities” under 
a voluntary settlement is the law by reference to which the settlement 
was made: the proper law. This conclusion was reached by encompass­
ing the voluntary settlement within the principle applied to a marriage 
settlement in Duke of Marlborough v. A.-G. (No. I),4 and applying 
the theory of the intention of the parties—prevalent in the field of 
pure contractual obligations—to the determination of the proper law 
of a trust inter vivos of intangible movables where foreign elements are 
involved, for estate dutv purposes. In his discussion of the develop­
ment of the intent theory in arriving at the law governing a contract. 
Prof. Nussbaum makes this observation:
R ecently the theory w hich makes the app licab le  law  dependent 
up on  the in ten t o f the parties — we shall b rie fly  term  it the 'in tent 
theory' —  has even been carried  over to trusts.'»
The view of this eminent jurist is indicative of the trend of the courts 
in some American states. W e shall seek to determine here if Re 
Iveagh represents the first application of the doctrine of the proper 
law to inter vivos trusts of intangible movables by an English court.
A preliminary point peculiar to this case should at the outset be 
made. W hen parties contract with a definite proper law in view, even 
though that law must be discovered for and attributed to them bv 
the court, it is the law of that country at the time a feature of the 
contract calls for adjudication, e.g., when a breach occurs, and not the 
law at the time the contract is entered into that must be applied.8 
However, it is when the contract is made that the selection of the 
proper law takes place, or is deemed to take place. W hen the settle­
ment in the instant case was executed in 1907, England and Ireland 
were under one system of law—that of the United Kingdom. Now, 
since the parties made no express choice of law to govern the trust 
on the execution of it, one cannot ascribe to them a cnoice of English
2 119541 Ch. 364; 11954] 2 W.L.R. 494; 119541 1 A ll E. R. 609.
3. In the United States, where there has been a steadier development of this aspect 
of the conflict of laws, additional elements have been the forum of the action 
and the implied intention of the settlor. See Swabenland, "The C onflict of Law s 
in the A dm inistration of Express T rusts of Personal P ro p erty” , 11936), 45 Yale L .J . 
438 at pp. 442-3.
4. 11945] Ch. 78; 119451 1 All E. R. 165 (C.A.I, which, in turn, derived its rule from  
conflictual rules respecting contracts.
5. Nussbaum, P rincip les of P riva te  In tern atio n a l L aw , 1943, p. 159. Tn a footnote to 
this statement the author states that there was not, as of then, any discussion of 
this topic, although there had been decided cases in the U. S.
6. We are not here concerned with the situation where the parties incorporate into 
a contract particular provisions of a given system of law which remains unaffected 
by any relevant change in that law once the contract has been entered into. See 
Cheshire, P rivate  In ternationa l Law , 4th Ed., 1952. pp. 209-10.
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or Irish law at that time. Indeed, the question would have no signifi­
cance.7 As Upjohn J. remarked:
It is in a sense a h yp oth etica l question because in 1907 . . .  it 
was all one country , and the question w h eth er the law o f Ireland  
o r the law  o f England governed was not a real question.*
But, with the political separation of the two countries the possibility 
of the present conflict arose and crystallized in the instant case. Thus, 
the intention of the parties, if one was to be ascertained, must be en­
tirely artificial, and the selection of the proper law totally dependent 
on other considerations albeit cloaked in the terms of the parties’ 
intention.0
A discussion of this topic is hampered because authorities on 
private international law (and judges, too) do not seem to have sep­
arated it from marriage settlements or the sale of chattels or the assign­
ment of choses in action. As one writer said:
Yet fo r the purposes o f the conflict o f laws one can not co m fo rt­
ab ly  id en tify  the typ ical inter vivos trust transaction e ith e r w ith  the  
transm ission o f an estate upon death or m arriage o r w ith  the sale or 
incum brance o f chattels.*0
W ith in  the framework of the trust concept itself clarity will be en­
couraged by adopting the following classification, gathered from writ­
ers on this matter:11
Between (1) a) the creation of the trust:
(i) capacity of the parties to the trust.
(ii) formal validity of the trust.
(iii) essential validity of the trust.
b) the administration of the trust.
c) construction of the trust instrument.
d) jurisdiction of the court to determine the above 
matters.
7. Moreover, the parties could not be heard to say in court (as they did in The 
Assunxione 119541 2 W.L.R. 234; (19541 1 A ll E.R. 278. C.A.) that they held dia­
m etrically opposed views as to which law they intended to govern their contract, 
although, as Singleton L.J. pointed out. nothing could be gained by demonstrating 
this fact since “that would have meant that there would have been no contract.”
8. Iv e a jh  v. In land R evenue Com m issioners [19541 1 A ll E.R. 609 at p. 614.
9. Had the settlement contained a clause stating that the law of the United Kingdom  
should govern the validity and administration of the settlement, even more formidable 
difficulties would have arisen. How could that intention per se be effectuated? 
Moreover, would the express use of the phrase “English law ” have necessarily 
meant the law of England as distinguished from the law of the U.K.?
10. Cavers. "Trusts Inter Vivos and Conflict of Laws”, 11930], 44 Harv. L. Rev. 161 at 
p. 188. This article investigated the problem of the law which determined the 
validity of an Inter v ivos trust of movables and set aside that of administration. 
Lathem in “The Creation and Administration of a Trust in the Conflict of Laws.” 
(1953J, 6 Current Legal Problems, p. 176. says: "But although books on the Con­
flict of Laws devote a chapter to contract, and one to tort, I know of none with a 
systematic chapter on trusts.”
Halsbury, 3rd Ed., vol. 7, p. 76 discusses Re Iveagh  under the heading Settlem ents 
and Assignments, making no distinction between an ordinary trust and a m arriage 
settlement.
11 Land, op. ctt., pp. 1-2; Beale, “Living Trusts of Movables in the Conflict of Laws’*, 
(19321 45 Harv. L. Rev. 969; Cavers, loc. c lt., passim ; Swabenland, loc c lt .; Hoar, 
"Some Aspects of Trusts in the Conflict of Laws”, [1948], 26 Can. Bar Rev. 1415.
Between (2) taxation of trust property, including inheritance, 
property, gift and income tax.
Between (3) a} testamentary trusts and 
b) inter vivos trusts.
Between (4) a) trusts of immovables and
b) trusts of tangible movables and intangibles.
Since the distinctions in these various groups arc of different orders, 
it is evident that there are numerous potential combinations of them; 
e.g., the court might be concerned with the administration of a trust 
intei vivos of intangible movables or a problem of taxation respecting a 
testamentary trust of movables. Unfortunately, the above classification 
has not been recognized by English courts. However, it would appear 
that matters of succession duty*2 have been treated under administra­
tion.13 Lord Greene M R. in Duke of Marlborough v. A.-G. (No. 1) 
said:
T h e next case is Attorney-General x>. Jeicisli Colonization Associa­
t io n n  T h ere  a dom iciled A u strian  assigned p ro p erty  to  an English 
com pany by deed un d er w hich the se ttlo r Has to receive the incom e  
d u rin g  his life  and a fte r his death the com pany was to ap p ly  the  
p ro p erty  fo r the benefit o f Russian Jew s. T h e  settlem ent was w ritten  
in the English language and was in English form . The com pany  
was one w hich ap art from  fo rm al m atters conducted its business from  
its p rin c ip a l o ffice  in Paris. A t the death  o f the don or w hen d u tv  
was claim ed the g reater p art o f the investm ents w ere fore ign  in vest­
m ents and on ly  a sm all p ro p o rtio n  w ere B ritish. Speaking o f this 
case in Attorney-General v. Belilios*5 Sargant L .J. points o u t that 
it w ould  not have been necessary fo r the court ‘to ap p ly  fo reign  law  
fo r the purposes of administration  . . . ¡6
English decisions are scanty and relate in the main to marriage 
settlements,17 and “they strongly point to the conclusion that the 
courts are inclined to emphasize the contractual aspect of trust trans­
fers in preference to assimilating them to property transfers.”18 An 
early case considering an inter vivos trust of intangible movables, which 
was not cited in Re Iveagh, is A.-G. v. Felce 10 where a Frenchman 
created a trust in 1880. The trust res — various foreign stocks and
12. Succession duty was abolished in England by the Finance Act. 1949, s. 27 <li and <2>.
13. Croucher, "Trusts of Moveables in Private International Law”, [1940], 4 Modern L. 
Rev. I l l  and cases therein discussed. Upjohn J. in Re Iveagh considers the question 
as one affecting the "rights and liabilities of the parties”, a phrase which could 
embrace validity as well as administration. Cf. Schmitthoff, English C onflict of Law s, 
3rd Ed., 1954, p. 218. where the author cites Re Iveagh in support of the statement 
that “as far as the creation [i.e., the validity] of the trust is concerned, there can 
be little doubt that that act is governed by the law intended by the settlor and the 
other parties to the trust.”
14. [1900 ] 2 QB 556 [Ridley & Darling J J , ]; [1901] 1 K B. 123 (C.A.)
15. [1928] 1 K.B. 798 at p. 820 iC.A.»
16. [1945] Ch. 78 at p. 86 (C.A.i This case itse lf involved a determination whether suc­
cession duty was exigible on certain trust funds settled under a marriage settlement. 
Cf. Lathem. Op cit., p. 183, where the view is taken that these succession duty cases 
purported to find the law governing the creation  of the trust.
17. Croucher, loc. c it., emphasizes that the English cases he examines relate to marriage 
settlements, and that the principles of them might not necessarily apply to ordinary 
trusts.
18. [1950], 3 International L. Q. at p. 89. The w riter of this note states that the only 
relevant English decision is Re P ilk in g to n ’s W ill T rusts [1937] 3 A ll E. R. 213 [Farwell 
J . l .  He discusses an Australian case which considered the law applying to the valid­
ity of an in te r  v ivos trust.
19. [1894], 10 T.L.R. 337 IQ 6. Div., Mathew & Cave J J .  Westlake, P riv a te  In ternation a l 
Law , 7th Ed., 1925, appears to be the only recent conflicts text to cite this case.
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securities—was placed in the hands of an English trustee domiciled in 
England. All tne stocks and securities, which were pavable to bearer, 
were deposited by the trustee in an English bank (and thus situate in 
England) and the trustee made a declaration of trust in accordance 
with the settlor’s direction, for the benefit of certain persons, who 
were all Frenchmen domiciled in France, but were not his lineal issue. 
On the death of the trustee, the defendant and another were his ex­
ecutors. The settlor died in 1891 and the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue claimed stamp and estate duty (which was paid) and alsc 
succcssion duty on the capital value of the trust funds (less the account 
duty) passing on the settlor’s death and derived from him as pre­
decessor, under the declaration of trust, to the persons mentioned as 
bcncficiaries. The executors refused to pay the succession duty.
The Crown argued that the declaration of trust was executed in 
England, that the trustee was and continued to be domiciled in Eng­
land and the executors were domiciled in England, and that the 
securities were situate in England. The Crown stressed the point 
that the trust was created in order to obtain the protection and benefit 
of English law and was thus an “English trust”. Dicey Q.C. (for the 
executors), contended that the court must consider whether under all 
the circumstances the fund and the objects of the trust were foreign 
or English. The court held that the trust was English and consequently 
succession duty was payable. In so doing, it followed W allace v. A.-G.,20 
A.-G. v. Campbell 21 and In re C igala’s Trusts.22 Mr. Justice Cave said:
T h e disposer o f the fu nds in the present case has expressly created
an English trust to  secure it according to English law . on account o f
the app reh en sion s he en terta in ed  as to the state o f a ffa irs  in France.23
The court used no phraseology reminiscent of “proper law’’ but instead 
spoke of an “English trust” . Nevertheless, although the report of this 
ease is short and the judgments evidently oral, it is submitted that the 
leading factor which brought the court to an application of English 
law as governing the trust was the intention of the settlor as expressed 
in his desire to obtain the protection of English law. It will be 
observed that the court rejected the very element which weighed most 
heavilv with Upjohn J. in Re Iveagh, namelv, the domicile of the settlor 
and the beneficiaries. In both cases the iaw applied was that of the 
situs of the trust property, but in the Felce case, whether the court 
regarded the various other factors which established a connection with 
England as relevant considerations does not appear from the judgments.
In the Re Iveagh situation the subjective theory of intention 
breaks down, whether it is attempted to imply or to impute that in­
tention. It was impossible for the parties on making the settlement to 
choose between English and Irish law since they formed one system. 
The theory might be supported by adopting Schmitthoff’s view tliat:
20. 11865], L.R . 1 Ch. Ap. 1.
21. (18721, L.R . 5 H.L. 524.
22. 11878], 7 ch. D. 351 (Je sse l M .R .i
23. 11894], 10 T.L.R . 337 a t p. 338.
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. . . ihc search fo r the presum ed in ten tion  o f the parties becomes, 
in fact, the a ttrib u tio n  o f a fictitiou s in ten tion  to them  and the courts 
insert in the contract a provision  w hich the parties, 'as just and  
reasonab le p eop le ’ w ou ld  p rob ab ly  have inserted if th e ir a tten tio n  
had been d irected  to contigencies w hich escaped th e ir notice.?-*
In the present case this would involve inserting in the settlement by 
the court a provision that if at any time after it was executed, the 
law of England and Ireland were to differ, then Irish law would 
govern the trust. Certainly, in Re Iveagh there was 1 1 0  real basis for 
the discussion of intention, be it that of tne paities or that of the settlor 
only. This is not to say that intention should never be the means 
of ascertaining the law governing an inter vivos trust; but, it is submit­
ted, the intention should be limited to that of the settlor, although one 
of the matters in discerning this intention could be the domicile of 
the beneficiaries.-5 In this rcspect there would be a departure from 
the intention theory in contract.
If this case is looked upon as supporting the objective tlicorv of 
intention—the law of that countrv governs with which the contract has 
the most real or substantial connection—it must be remembered that 
this connection is not a matter of quantity, for in Re Iveagh, a majority 
of factors connected the settlement with England.2”
Succession duty was attracted in England27 if the successor be­
comes entitled to the property by English law, and that is so when 
“the property is found to be legally vested in a person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the British courts, and the title to the beneficial interest 
in the property is regulated and capable of being enforced by the laws 
of this country . . .’ 28 In Canada, payment of succession duty 011  a 
movable depends 01 1  its situs, since under the B.N.A. Act, pro­
vincial authority to levy tax is confined to taxation “within the prov­
ince” .-*' Situs, then, is all-important, possibly to the exclusion of all 
other elements, even where the movable is held in trust. A 11 instruc­
tive case is Attorney-General for Ontario v. Fasken et al.30 where F 
set up a trust of a chose 111 action in these ciicumstanccs: while domicil­
ed and resident in Ontario, he advanced money to a Texas company
24. Schm itthoff. Op cit., p. 105. See also The Assunzione 119541 1 All E. R. 278; 119541
2 W.L.R. 234 (C.A.i and note in 1954, 17 Modern L. Rev. at p. 255. It seems obvious 
that it is reasonability in the judge’s conception. The learned judge in Re Iveagh 
119541 1 A ll E. R at p 616» said: “the decisive matter here, in m y judgm en t, is that 
this is a settlement to benefit a fam ily in Ireland . . .” See in this regard George C. 
Anspach Co. Ltd. v. C.N.R. 119501 3 D.L.R. 26- (Ont. H. C. Wilson J .).
25. This test would lose significance when the beneficiaries did not have a common 
domicile.
26. Numerical preponderance of factual connections has been suggested to be of im­
portance in deciding the court which has ju risd iction  to pass on questions of admin­
istration of the trust. Swabenland, Op. c it., at pp. 438-9.
27. See Footnote 12, supra.
28. Halsbury, Laws of England, 2nd Ed , Vol. 13, p. 357 et seq, where an alternative test 
is suggested in the settlor's intention. See A tto rney-G eneral v. Jew ish  Colonization 
A ssociation 119011 1 K B 123 per Collins L.J. at p. 136, 137. Also, Halsbury, Op. cit, s. 
396: "Where a person, whether domiciled in this country or abroad by an Inter vivos 
disposition, creates an English or Scottish settlement of personal property, whether 
locally situate in this country or abroad, succession duty is chargeable upon the 
death of a life tenant under the settlement, even though the property may then be 
locally situate abroad.” The question, of course, is, How is the court to determine 
that the settlement is English so that it is governed by English law.
29. B.N.A. Act, 1867, s. 92 (2).
30. 119351 OR. 288, [19351 3 D.L.R. 100 (Ont. C.A.).
1
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with head officc and only place of business in that state. Later, F 
procured from the company a written acknowledgement of the debt 
in favour of three nominees, who, by a declaration of trust prepared in 
Ontario, bccamc trustees of the chose for beneficiaries outside Ontario. 
F died domiciled in Ontario and the Ontario government claimed 
payment of succession duty on the debt owing by that company. The 
court held that, by the law of Texas, the debt had a situs in Texas and 
was not subject to duty in Ontario. •
Counsel for the Attorney-General stressed the presence of a trust 
with so many factors connecting it with Ontario and relied on many of 
the cases citcd above. The view of the court on the importance of their 
being a trust is epitomized in a statement in counsel for the defendant’s 
argument:
As to (he conten tion  that the settlem ent was an O ntario  settle­
m ent. the form  and language and m an ner o f execution o f the d ec la ra ­
tion have noth ing  to do w ith the situs o f the p ro p erty .s i
It is submitted that Re Iveagh lays down a rule which extends 
beyond the matter of estate duty and includes the administration32 (and 
possibly the validity) of a trust inter vivos of movables. There is a 
Canadian case concerning the administration of a testamentary trust 
which, as a result, should be noted, namely, In re Nanton Estate.33 
In this case a Manitoba court applied the lex situs, which was also the 
lex fori, as the law controlling what was without a doubt a question of 
administration. In so doing, the court adopted a statement by Dean 
Falconbridgc:
It w ou ld  seem th at w h atever be the n atu re  o f the trust r r t  and  
w h atever be the law  governin g  the creation o f the trust, the law  gov­
ern in g  the ad m in istra tion  should , as a general ru le , be the lex rei sitae. 
in clud ing  w h atever effect that law gives to the expressed or im plied  
in ten tion  o f the testator.34
Since the author sets out a simple rule for the administration of an 
inter vivos trust,35 it is quite possible that a Canadian judge might pre­
fer this view to that in Re Iveagh. Perhaps the only appreciable dif­
ferences between the two are tnat the English case speaks of “the 
intention of the parties’' while the Canadian decision touches only that 
of the settlor, and secondly, (and this may be the more divergent ele­
ment), the Manitoba case would have us discover the settlor’s intention 
by the lex rei sitae while in Re Iveagh the parties’ intention was ascer­
tained by application of the lex fori.
—Franklin O. Leger,
Lord Beaverbrook Overseas Scholar, 
London School of Economcs.
31. Ibid ., at p. 290.
32. Or other matters of administration, it the exigibility of duty be looked upon as aris­
ing under the law governing the administration of the Inter vivo* trust.
33. [1948], 56 Man. R. 71; [1948 ] 2 W W.R. 113 (Williams C .J.K .B .) followed in In re 
O ldfield Estate (No. 2>; [1949], 57 Man. R. 193 (Williams C .J.K .B .).
34. Falconbridge, Op clt., 1947, p. 560 ; 2nd Ed., 1954, p. 639. The validity of a te s tam en tary  
trust is, in general, governed by the law of the testator’s domicile at his death .
35. Ibid., p. 640.
